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Over my career I have backed into things.  Not 
in my car, but in the woods!  I backed into 
maple thickets in Oregon, blackberry bushes in 
the Virginia Piedmont, “laurel” (rhododendron) 
in North Carolina, and who knows what 
collection of awful things in Florida.  I expect 
you understand very well the term “backing in.”  
I want to back into some ideas in this paper.  I 
have advocated to my classes in Systems 
Ecology that they back into their analyses.  I 
also say “start at the end.”  By this I mean think 
about the desired end conditions, the history you 
wish you could read, or what you expect in some 
final evaluation report, and then work 
backwards, up the flow chart, to be sure that the 
desired final condition happens.  We need now 
to look into an analysis of vertebrate damage 
management for the future. 
 
PRACTICAL MEMORY 
Ray Hilborn (1992), a fisheries scientist, 
complained that fisheries, as a field of work, has 
no institutional memory.  As we think about the 
vertebrate damage management system for the 
future, we need to be sure we have a memory 
that prevents us from making that claim and the 
same mistakes.  We cannot avoid making 
mistakes (for reasons too many to discuss here).  
We usually can avoid making the same mistake.  
Hilborn (1992) observed that there are few 
places where the need for institutional learning  
 
has occurred (March 1988), but there is evidence 
that it can occur and it is intuitive that it is 
needed. 
 
There have been amazing changes in technology 
and in society, and some people will argue that 
history has little meaning today.  I only argue 
that many good ideas have failed because of a 
poor presentation or because they were 
presented at the wrong time or place, or to the 
wrong person.  The past system context for an 
idea may have been wrong; failure was not 
necessarily due to the quality of the idea.  To 
document the reason for the failure may allow 
the efficiencies of the idea to be gained later.  
History does cost, but so does any mistake or 
past inefficiency.  We need a cost-effective 
memory, one that is brief, practical, and oriented 
to a high probability of retrieval.  We need one 
with a mechanism for being moved into current 
decision making. 
 
In order to develop a practical memory, I 
suggest: 
1. Periodic staff debriefing (twice a year 
reviews; the recent history). 
2. A computer question-and-answer system 
designed to prompt people (once-a-year 
use) for answers and comments that may 
be useful later. This is a growing 
computer file of expert commentary. 
3. Old-timer seminars (suggested by 
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Hilborn 1992). 
4. Memoirs of retirees commissioned by 
the collective profession and written (as 
needed) with paid assistance. 
5. New staff requirements (that they at 
least read important components and 
abstracts of the various historical 
media). 
 
The history needs to be practical.  I assume that 
much learning is built into policies.  These tend 
to suggest limits and things to avoid and often 
emerge from past problems.  Most people in the 
audience have heard: “Get rid of the massive 
policy manual!”  However, at least the grounds 
for the policy manual need to be remembered.  
Policy doesn't emerge on its own. 
 
I assume that techniques will be improved and 
thus embodied within each of them is a form of 
institutional learning.  I am more concerned 
about remembering what did not work and why 
it was changed.  I am even more concerned that 
the reason why the technique was first used may 
have changed.  This is called “displacement of 
the objective” and it brings me to my next topic. 
 
OBJECTIVES 
By “starting at the end,” I mean that we need a 
clear statement of a destination.  That is the only 
way we can tell when we have arrived (the 
clarity of the logic exceeds the clarity of the map 
to the destination).  What will be the “good” in 
this history that we create for ourselves?  We 
have to be sure that our work on improved traps, 
trapping, devices, and repellents does not 
displace the objective.  Why were we doing the 
work in the first place?  Perhaps the objective 
was improved profit.  If so, the evaluation of our 
work in the net income column should not be 
displaced by trap effectiveness, number of traps, 
area covered, or animals taken.  There can be big 
differences between the two. 
 
I have studied objectives and objective setting 
for years (Giles 1981) and with students 
(Buffington 1972, Cowles and Giles 1982, Lee 
1972, Lobdell 1972, Ritter 1975, Waldon 1987).  
It is a topic as discussable as UFOs and, based 
on the evidence that I now have, just about as 
meaningful.  Over many years I have argued for 
stating a large set of objectives (because we 
have many), estimating the amounts of each 
product or service that we need, assigning 
relative importance to each (because I know 
they are not of equal importance), assigning a 
probability of success or failure (because nature, 
weather, etc., will have its way no matter what 
our objectives may be), and then stating what we 
will substitute for some of those things we 
“demand.”  This all gets very complicated, but it 
is readily handled by computer.  At least the 
equation and the relations described in it can 
help people understand and explain why some 
people are so sympathetic and other people have 
such disagreements.  The chance of two people 
having equal objectives is almost zero. 
 
Vertebrate damage management specialists 
(managers) are perceived (at least by me) as 
working at all parts of the system to achieve a 
high score using these concepts within a 
computer.  The score improves as they reduce 
losses, achieve demand, modify values, make 
expectations realistic, encourage substitutions, 
and reduce costs and losses. 
 
Now, however, I give up!  I’ve fought the good 
fight and failed.  I give up on trying to get 
people to work with such objectives.  I suggest 
that the objective for our field be 
 
to assist (public and private) land and 
property owners maximize profits 
partially by minimizing system costs 
(and equivalent actual or perceived 
losses) to vertebrate wild and semi-
domestic animals, all subject to legal, 
ecological, economic, esthetic, and 
energetic constraints; all within a 10% 
zone of performance; and all counted 
over a dynamic 100-year planning 
period. 
 
That is it.  That is all.  Just do it, any way 
possible.  The scientists can work on the basic 
processes; the economists can work on the 
algorithms; the foresters and agronomists can 
worry about whether “yield” means wood, 
tomatoes, or profit; the nay-sayers can debate 
profit-motives, the free-market, and 
entrepreneurial systems.  The ecologists can 
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struggle with what “relations” really mean and 
search for true "interactions;" and the vertebrate 
damage managers can work with them all.  
 
VDM 
I do not approve of the word “integrated” in IPM 
(integrated pest management) (ct. Giles 1980).  
If I am managing, I am integrating, I am 
working with everything all at once.  The 
modern person working in our field is working 
with a whole complex system.  Such people are 
attempting to manage (or assist in managing) a 
whole system.  Not to integrate things as a 
manager is silly, without meaning.  I am 
opposed to the idea of managing pests.  I want to 
manage their effect or perceived effect (e.g., a 
bat flying through a bakery).  I may have to kill 
or move an animal or increase its predators, but I 
can use barriers.  I can use metal containers.  
When I exclude mice from grain, am I managing 
pests?  Poisoning them, yes; excluding them, I 
think not.  Of course I am managing their 
effects.  When I prevent damage, I rarely do 
anything to the animals themselves.  When I 
change knowledge of a cute animal into a 
disease vector, have I managed the pest?  I think 
not; only the perception of the animal problem.  
I think we should manage perceived damage and 
reduce it at reasonable costs, not just manage 
pests. 
 
I have no option but to hold on to the word 
vertebrate.  As a person advocating a total 
system view, I see no way to separate high 
quality work on reducing costs and losses from 
wild animals -- whether they are vertebrates or 
invertebrates is a matter of their bones, not my 
practice.  When I think of mosquitoes, I am 
thinking of tree holes and birds and flying 
squirrels.  When I think of mice, I think of fleas, 
plague, and hanta virus.  When I recommend 
“sanitation,” I am as involved in reducing 
invertebrates as with vertebrates.  When I work 
with moles, I am actively involved (or believe I 
should be) with invertebrates, the creatures in 
the soil.  I give up!  Use “vertebrate;” draw 
another line, restrict our work and thoughts; but 
let us realize what we have done.  Let us see 
these divisions that we have made as a regional 
line created for efficiency, employment, and for 
teaching and not as ground to be fought over as 
if by territorial squawking birds. 
 
We are not wildlife managers because they 
cannot decide who they are.  They cannot decide 
and neither can we.  They call themselves 
“biologists,” but rarely do they talk about 
botany, require little botany in their education, 
spend 80% of their professional time working 
with groups of plants (which they call “habitat”), 
and cannot recognize a professional society 
take-over by an emerging bunch with the non-
name of “conservation biology.”  “Teaming with 
Wildlife,” a national tax proposal,  if successful, 
will unleash massive new pest problems.  
Agencies have struggled with names and proper 
“homes” for vertebrate damage management 
work for years.  The U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, with its own identity crises over many 
years (in the very name itself), allowed damage 
work to move to the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture.  Amazed observers note that moves 
within Departments are common; between 
Departments, rare. 
 
We are regulators; we are “Extension;” we are 
emergency services; we are public health 
workers; members of the agroforestry and agro-
silvo-pastoral efforts.  We are very diverse and 
scattered unequally throughout health fields, 
agriculture, military, product suppliers, 
inventors, and livestock people.  As customs 
workers, we stand guard to prevent invasions; as 
students, we follow those creatures already 
having invaded.  My view is that the demands 
for effective vertebrate damage management are 
profound.  They encompass all of the concepts, 
techniques, and work of the field once called 
game management, now called imprecisely and 
inaccurately wildlife management.  They 
demand breadth of knowledge of ecology (more 
than classical wildlife management), and 
simultaneously they require use of the extra 
knowledge domains of economics, esthetics, and 
energetics ... all within the envelope of 
enforcement systems.  This will not be embraced 
by any agency, any university.  We need total 
systems people.  What person recommends 
costly population controls to a person otherwise 
going into bankruptcy?  What person accepts 
costs of operations far greater than the benefits 
likely to be received?  What more than the most 
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simple economics requires that we discount 
treatment costs over the life of a program if we 
are going to do reasonable financial analyses?  
More than “biologists” are needed! 
 
I am now convinced that more good for 
humanity can be done over the next 20 years for 
the expanding world of 5.7 billion people by 
those people in the vertebrate damage 
management area than by all advances in 
agricultural research (Huffaker et al. 1976).  We 
can reduce losses of the total production by 10% 
or more; agriculturists are not likely to increase 
net production by that much.  Vertebrate 
damage management is an essential in modern 
society.  It is an essential for survival.  The 
population is expanding.  We shall not bring it 
under control.  It will double in 50 years at our 
present rate.  It has already doubled since I've 
been on Earth.  I feel crowded, stressed; things 
are half as sweet, we are more than twice as 
“bad off.” 
 
We have to see ourselves, clearly, to be very, 
very important for ourselves, our natural 
resources, and for our children.  Who are we for 
the future?  Vertebrate damage managers?  I 
once defined wildlife management using the 
phrase “the science and art” (Giles 1971).  I now 
reject that.  Wildlife management just means 
deciding and manipulating populations, habitats, 
and people.1  There is science and some art, but 
much more.  It is just doing it.  “Science” crept 
into my thought and that of U.S. society with 
Sputnik.  If anything was scientific, it was good.  
That premise secretly slipped into “it is only 
good if it is scientific.”  Now we can step back 
and realize that there are many ways to know 
things.  Science (typically induction/deduction) 
is only one.  We need a new way to proceed.  
Science can help, but it is only one of many 
ways to know—to know how to manage 
                                                 
1My current recommendation is: Wildlife 
management is making decisions and taking 
action to manipulate the structure, dynamics, 
and relations of wild animal (and plant) 
populations, faunal space, and people to 
achieve specific, stated human objectives by 




THE KNOWLEDGE BASE 
We have to use the power of the geographic 
information system (Jones 1976, deSteiger and 
Giles 1981, Giles and Nielsen 1991) to 
understand what animals are involved where; 
what people are involved; what the estimated 
real losses are and how those will match with the 
estimated costs of control, enforcement, 
applications, and inspections.  We now have 
wildlife information systems in >20 states; we 
have demonstrated we can “do ecology” at the 
level of areas about 1/3 the size of a football 
field.  We've moved past speculation and dreams 
of Giles (1973) and into the world of monthly 
advances in relevant applications heralded in 
trade magazines (e.g., GIS World).  
 
I have spent 30 years modeling natural resource 
systems and advocating use of systems analyses 
and computer decision aids (Giles 1979).  I now 
finally realize that every model I attempted to 
create requires more data, more inputs, than I 
could ever get (e.g., Gruen 1993, Wajda 1993).  
I attributed my lack of success to someone else's 
failure to get and hold data for me.  A simple 
vertebrate population model with any practical 
meaning requires a minimum of 34 pieces of 
information.  I now realize that these data rarely 
are available for any population, even those 
most intensively studied!  It is interesting to 
think about them, program them, simulate what 
would happen if certain numbers existed, but we 
now know that the numbers do not exist and the 
funds for getting them do not exist, and the time 
required to get and process them is too great for 
them to be of timely use.  I once thought funny 
the statement “We can use a computer to predict 
exactly the next day’s weather . . .  but it takes a 
week to run it!”  Just last year a forest model 
was reported to take 3 weeks to run on today’s 
fast PCs!  The situation is no longer funny.  
Timely approximations from feasible-to-run 
programs remain needed.  We need powerful 
alternatives, one of which is a growing 
knowledge base with emphasis on ranges and 
medians, not means and deviation.  We need all 
of the aspects of the rationally robust paradigm 
(Giles 1979, Giles et al. 1993). 
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THE RATIONALLY ROBUST PARADIGM 
There are 10 components of the paradigm that I 
propose (Giles et al. 1993) as a replacement 
paradigm for the pseudo-scientific, crisis-
response, agency-bound, predominantly 
socialistic policies under which much vertebrate 
damage management work is now done.  All of 
these, I assert, for the future are too concentrate 
on profit (within constraints) as defined above. 
They are: 
1. Use site-specific knowledge, typically in 
a GIS, acknowledging that every site is 
unique. 
2. Acknowledge the limits and consistency 
of financial support, minimizing costs 
and accepting the unlikelihood of long-
term studies. 
3. Accept lower confidence levels for 
(statistical) sampling and reaching 
conclusions. 
4. Use estimates of median values (to 
replace the mean). 
5. Use knowledge of range limits of 
ecological factors. 
6. Study the general system's phenomenon 
of equifinality and its consequences. 
7. De-emphasize time in system analyses, 
replacing it with other phenomena such 
as cumulative energy received. 
8. Use regression techniques, 
simultaneously using factors that 
operate in many models (e.g., 
precipitation). 
9. Use regression and modeling techniques 
to accommodate the non-linear nature of 
most economic, aesthetic, and 
ecological systems. 
10. Operate as if in a clinical milieu, with 




Years ago, state operated soil-testing labs were 
privatized.  Free (tax-paid) soil tests were 
inappropriate in an entrepreneurial system.  Only 
when an open market existed did private soil 
labs become possible.  By analogy, and for other 
more compelling reasons, I hold that vertebrate 
damage management can and should exist in an 
open market environment.  The public is served 
inadequately by the budget-strapped, often 
inefficient agency.  Needs are increasing; the tax 
base is not increasing; the customer is changing 
rapidly to the urbanite or to the agribusiness 
person.  The power of the current knowledge of 
the field is not being used and developments for 
the future remain in the hands of a tax-limited 




I believe studies should be done and techniques 
developed by companies to achieve a 
competitive edge.  Superior students who will 
work will be recruited by well-paying 
companies.  Effective practices will be used to 
achieve highest success for lowest cost as in any 
open-market system.  Prevention contracts will 
be seen to be as valuable as fire insurance.  
Rapid-response units will form as collectives 
from within often-competing companies.  Of 
course, there will remain regulation, the 
enforcement of which is the rightful role of 
agencies, but beyond this, there is the need for 
vital companies working to help landowners 
make profit, reducing inappropriate regulation 
and control costs, and either adding gains or 
reducing losses from vertebrates.  A deer (for 
example) in a regulated environment is at once 
an urban pet, a crop destroyer, an aesthetic 
entity, and a potential trophy game animal.  It 
destroys endangered plants, changes forest 
structure, contributes to improving forest site 
index, is a highway hazard, and is one vector of 
ticks transmitting Lyme disease.  There is no 
“solution” for the deer problem.  It is called by 
one analyst a “wicked problem” for which there 
is no solution, only the needs for management to 
blunt the extreme conditions for separate groups.  
The professional vertebrate damage manager is 
needed.  Such people can deal with such large, 
complex, multi-faceted problems.  How will 
they (or society or customers) know when they 
succeed when there is not a solution?  By the 
measure of constrained profit.  The constraints 
are ecological (do not extirpate; do not diminish 
an endangered species; work for desired natural 
productivity of forests, waters, and rangelands).  
The constraints also are economic or monetary 
(limited staff, equipment, budgets, cash flow, 
time, required profit, and discount rate).  The 
constraints also are energetic (energy 
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conservation and preparedness for looming 
fossil-energy shortages).  They are aesthetic 
(subject to group and individual sensibilities 
relative to humane tactics, animal care, and 
animal removals).  Except for major public 
constraints (laws, regulations, and policies), 
moving professional work to the private sector 
allows an objective to be decided and progress 
to be made.  Without such clarification, 
damage/or pest-related agencies are adrift.  Their 
performance is recited in calls that are made by 
the public, counts of animals moved, and other 
numbers unrelated to their real objective—
presumably the health, safety, welfare, economic 
well-being, and quality of life of citizens (Giles 
1982).  No one yet has a measure for the 
collective “social good” (except the scoring 
procedure suggested above) and I do not 
recommend waiting for one to be used.  In our 
modern society, I recommend working toward 
constrained profit in a free enterprise system. 
 
PROFIT VS YIELD 
In creating a model of tomato disease, I 
discovered that the effect of disease on profit 
was not known.  Must 100% crop loss always be 
assumed?  Perhaps birds cause loss of grade in a 
fruit, but what is the total loss in profit for the 
year, given the current complex of supports, 
tariffs, and transportation cost?  What was the 
tolerable loss for a landowner before the 
minimum profit threshold was passed? 
 
I once suggested to an agency that my models of 
a boll weevil control program could suggest very 
effective control, so effective that it would 
increase cotton supplies and cause the price of 
cotton to drop, perhaps below a profit margin.  I 
was encouraged not to pursue that line of 
analysis. 
 
“Sustained yield” is required of the U.S. Forest 
Service.  Often debated, it is very important that 
yield be interpreted as profit, not cubic yards of 
wood.  Neither in forestry nor elsewhere is 
biological yield the end result needed.  Sustained 
productivity of products in a deflated economy 
can lead to bankruptcy. 
 
The point of these examples is that there is a 
need, a glowing opportunity for a modern 
profession of vertebrate damage management to 
step into the forestry-agricultural and the 
expanded residential-urban realm to help 
customers see clearly their monetary or financial 
situation and to engage in cost-effective analyses 
of their enterprise and the role that rational 
vertebrate damage management can play. 
 
Critics for years have claimed that no one can 
quantify the worth of a duck or the beauty of a 
sunset.  I advocate not trying, agreeing.  My 
hypothesis is that “money talks;” that when 
financial concerns clearly are incorporated into a 
100-year profit -making enterprise with all the 
needed societal constraints, then all of those 
extra, said to be non-quantifiable, needs will be 
amply accommodated—ducks and sunsets. 
 
THE VDM SYSTEM 
The professional manager is not yet being 
produced in the University.  It is unlikely this 
will occur soon for reasons I am embarrassed to 
discuss, so I recommend and believe a high-
intensity educational program can emerge.  
Created by one company or a collective, 
education for profit can emerge. 
 
Research needs to be company specific, but a 
company also is likely to find that a research and 
development group may be useful.  “Basic 
research” rarely will be tolerated; use of existing 
knowledge, synthesis, and modeling to help find 
the sensitive areas that can be manipulated will 
be the task of this group, which itself, can be 
financially self -sufficient. 
 
The “pest control operator” has already had 
many tools removed from the arsenal of 
managerial tactics.  The new profession needs to 
regain these, to overcome the reasons for past 
removals, and to exercise skillful, site-specific, 
timely, cost-effective field work after the 
computer-aided analysis has been made of 
expected financial returns in the context of the 
customer's needs (and society's constraints).  [I 
find this free-market concept analogous to the 
freedom to go anywhere in the U.S., as long as 
you follow the rules of the road.] 
 
We in vertebrate damage management have to 
achieve (at least in some place) a level of 
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expertise, competence, and image that will allow 
us to do the work needed.  I have in mind an 
image of a Mayo Clinic, a Rand Corporation.  I 
have in mind military special forces—Rangers 
or Seals.  There are pieces of an image, one or 
more centers of exceptional capability in 
analyzing, designing, and implementing a 
vertebrate damage management system. 
 
I am convinced that with increasing college 
costs, shrinking class hours, grade inflation, 
professors without experience, a persuasive 
reductionist research paradigm (which will not 
change soon), and narrow college 
departmentalism, there will be no graduates to 
hire for these imagined centers of excellence.  
Therefore, I see the need to privatize an 
educational center for the vertebrate damage 
management system.  I do not believe we can 
count on any university.  One or two modified 
curricula locked within the present-day 
university cannot handle the task or overcome 
the contextual inertia for the tasks ahead.  
Vertebrate damage managers need their own 
“special force” educational center, one that 
recruits special people, educates them (and 
continues to do so) to deal with the total 
production system for society, and then does it. 
 
Along with the people of such a center there will 
be needed complex staff work to implement the 
selective, unique tasks usually needed.  Usually 
average solutions are suboptimal.  Suboptimum 
is the enemy.  There is need for the injunction, 
the subvention, the emergency procedure—in 
carefully analyzed situations.  The law is right 
for the average, everyday case; the law can be a 
messenger of policy and limits.  The growing 
daily needs, however, are for the equivalent of 
laser surgery, and the military strike.  We have a 
long way to go and we'll not achieve the 
perceived possible and needed changes in 50 
state offices, several national offices, or several 
agency offices.  We'll not achieve society's 
respect by defining ourselves as PCOs or as 
wildlifers with an emphasis, or as entomologists 
that apply their knowledge to large animals, or 
as health officers more interested in the virus 
than the vectors, and with a slogan of the 
question “but what can you do?” 
 
Let me assure you that I am very serious.  Do 
not dismiss the message today as that of an after-
thought.  We have within our grasp a profound 
need—safety, health, food, forests, rangeland, 
and quality urban spaces.  We can have that only 
when a vital system of vertebrate damage 
management is operated.  The need is too great 
and the solution too large and complex to be 
designed and managed by the average “grade-C” 
university graduate of a non-descript, small 
curriculum full of electives.  It will not be 
handled well by a biologist never having a 
course in economics.  The molecular biologist 
will not master “all ecology” in one watered-
down, over-extended, and case history-infused 
course on that topic.  With only 3% of the U.S. 
population now living on farms, the vocabulary 
of the field is no longer known by the person on 
the street.  Without the words, there can be no 
understanding! 
 
I do not like very much where my thoughts have 
taken me.  Perhaps I should back track.  Maybe 
“backing in” has been very bad.  “Backing in” 
can be dangerous if you don't know where you 
are going.  I know where vertebrate damage 
management must end up—a vital field of work 
serving all society, working to achieve the most 
profound of social, ecological, and esthetic 
objectives—working at purposefully achieving 
profitable partnerships in human health, safety, 
foods, welfare, recreation, and defense. 
 
We are too important; we know too much; 
people suffer too much damage.  We must 
develop a bold new strategy and then take action 
to create the vertebrate damage management so 
badly needed for the future. 
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